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Abstract 
This paper models the launch decision of pharmaceutical companies in regard to 
new drugs and country markets. New drugs are launched with a delay or not 
launched at all in many countries. Considering that many of these new drugs 
would have created health benefits to the patients, there seems to be welfare loss. 
We use market characteristics to explain this phenomenon. We show that most of 
the estimated launch with a delay and no-launch decision is due to observable 
market characteristics. The model has an accuracy of 70 percent in explaining the 
no-launch decision. Intellectual property rights protection is especially important. 
The policy implication is that stronger property rights increase the likelihood and 
speed of new drug launch. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper studies the decision by pharmaceutical companies of whether and 
when to launch a new drug in a specific country-market. We expect that innovator 
firms would want to sell their new drugs in every country if they can price their 
products at more than marginal costs which include production, licensing and 
retail elements. However, the facts seem contrary. Out of the 1095 new chemical 
entities introduced since 1982 only 427 on average have been made available in 
OECD countries. 
Market characteristics, such as potential demand, as well as the regulatory 
environment can influence the launch and timing decisions of pharmaceutical 
companies. We expect that innovator firms would want to sell their new drugs in 
every country assuming they can price their products more than marginal costs 
(including the costs associated with entering and operating a new market area). 
However Danzon et al. (2005) find that for a specified set of drugs among 25 
industrialized countries almost no country had more than half of the potential 
country drug launches within 12 months of their first launch in the world.  
The no-launch phenomenon is what strikes us as perplexing and inefficient. 
Chemical entities that are safe and effective in treating disease are a public good 
in the Demsetz (1970) sense. Efficiency considerations say they should be 
universally available. Health considerations put a fine edge on the efficiency 
argument. Lichtenberg (2001, 2005, 2007) has shown the improvements in health 
outcomes due to new drugs. Thus knowing why drugs are not launched 
everywhere is a step toward saving lives.  
We wonder how much of the no-launch decision might be explained by 
intellectual property considerations. We examine the phenomenon of drug 
availability by looking at several factors that should affect drug launch. Potential 
market size, intellectual property rights protection, and other country specific 
regulatory effects should all play a role. We are able to explain a substantial part 
of the no-launch decision. A large majority of no-launch observation is due to 
quantifiable market characteristics. A major finding is that property-rights 
protection plays a strong role in the launch/no-launch decision. The important 
policy implication is that stricter protection of the intellectual property rights of 
pharmaceutical developers might improve health outcomes. However please note 
that we do not study the costs associated with stricter protection of the 
intellectual property rights.  So we do not propose this policy for all countries. 
Each country should carefully review the costs and benefits associated with 
intellectual property rights. 
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These results are especially important considering the public debate about 
high drug prices in the United States (Danzon and Furukawa, 2008; Kanavos et al., 
2013). When we look at the issue superficially, other developed countries that 
keep drug prices low, get the best of both worlds. Drug companies spend huge 
amount of R&D investments and create new and (sometimes) better drugs 
because they hope to make profits from the United States. Once these drugs are 
developed, other developed countries get access to them at discount prices. 
However, the story is not quite so simple. Civan and Maloney (2006, 2009) find 
that drug companies focus their R&D money on the diseases which are more 
prevalent in the United States. Although this does not eliminate free riding 
motives, it should diminish it. In this study along with others in the relevant 
literature we show that there are some other costs of reducing drug company 
profits. Drug companies delay or stop altogether the launches of their new drugs 
in less profitable countries. In the meantime members of those societies are 
deprived of potential benefits of those new drugs. 
2. Background Literature 
Most medical scientists and heath economists believe that many new drugs 
significantly improve the medical care and patients’ life quality.  Obviously not all 
new drugs are wonder drugs or have substantial advances over the existing drugs. 
There are many “new” drugs that are very similar to the existing ones. The opinion 
about those drugs is more mixed. Many claim that they provide at least 
incremental benefits for some patients while others are in the opinion that they 
do not provide any clinical benefits. However even in the absence of clinical 
benefits, these new drugs might improve social welfare by reducing prices of 
existing drugs.   
Lichtenberg (2001, 2005, 2006) has published a series of articles on the 
values of new drugs using various data sources and methodologies. His studies 
confirm the proposition that new drugs are very useful in terms of better health 
outcomes. Civan and Koksal (2010) and Lichtenberg (2001) show that new drugs 
not only improve health care quality but reduce the total health care expenditures 
by reducing the need and demand for other types of health care such as hospital 
care and physician visitations. The effects of new drugs on the welfare of the 
individuals can be through two ways. First one is the improvements on the 
longevity.1  Moreover, increase in longevity can increase the incentives for human 
capital accumulation (mostly by increasing education and training) and can 
                                                          
1
 See Rosen (1988), Topel and Murphy (2003), Becker et al. (2005) and Soares(2007) for 
different aspects and estimates of increase in longevity on welfare.    
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decrease the risky life choices (smoking, speeding and similar attitudes).2  So it 
would seem like the real resources of the world are wasted when new drugs are 
not available for the majority of patients. In the dynamic sense this not only 
affects the societies of no-launch or late-launch countries but also early-launch 
societies as well. No-launch and late-launches decrease profit potentials of 
innovating pharmaceutical companies thus causing higher prices and/or reduced 
R&D investments (thus fewer new drugs). 
Once a drug is developed and clinical trials are completed, the innovator firm 
applies for the approval of the drug by the regulatory agency of the country. For 
many countries there are some fees involved on that licensing process.3 In many 
countries after the approval of the drug, the innovator firm has to settle with 
Ministry of Health and/or Social Security Agency in order to be included in drug 
reimbursement lists. This process naturally takes time and money. Many 
countries’ public agencies (drug licensing and reimbursement agencies) are slow 
so that there are significant lags between first approval date of the drug in 
another country in the world and its launch to that specific country. If the profit 
potential (due to low prices, low potential sales and low intellectual property 
rights protection) of the new drug in specific country is not high, the innovator 
firms might not apply for the approval of the drug for those relatively unprofitable 
markets.4 On the other hand, sometimes drugs can obtain approval in one country 
and not in another because of different level of strictness of drug licensing 
agencies.   
In the relevant literature two other potential reasons of drug companies’ 
unwillingness to market their new drugs are discussed: Parallel imports and 
reference pricing. (Lanjouw, 2005; Danzon and Epstein, 2008) Parallel imports are 
the importation of the drugs from cheaper countries to the more expensive ones. 
Since there are significant variations in the prices of same drugs across countries, 
there are profit potentials for the arbitrageurs by importing drugs from low price 
countries to high income countries. This creates a natural reservation for the drug 
companies to market drugs in low price countries. Although currently national 
legislations, policies of insurance companies, and the mood among health 
                                                          
2
 See Oster and et all. (2012) for a recent empirical estimate of increase in longevity and 
increase in education and training and also decrease in smoking.  
3
 In the United States the fee is $2,169,000 for a new drug application which require 
clinical trials.  
4
 See Acemoglu and Linn (2004), Giaggotto, Santerre and Vernon (2005), and Civan and 
Maloney (2006, 2009) 
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professionals and public at large prevent substantial volume of parallel imports, it 
has the potential to be a more significant cause of no-launch in the future.   
The bigger issue is that reference pricing of the drugs with the prices in other 
countries. Many countries determine the prices of the drugs by Ministries of 
Health and/or Social Security Reimbursement Agencies. An increasing number of 
countries use some form of external referencing system in the price 
determination process. Although there are various forms of the external 
reference pricing, the underlying concept is the same: the drug price is 
determined by the average or minimum price of the same drug in a set of 
countries selected by the government. Drug companies that fear the indirect price 
effect of low drug price countries on high price country markets, either do not 
launch or delay the launch of their drugs in those countries.  
Several papers on the literature studied the issue formally and tried to 
determine factors affecting drug companies launch decisions. Danzon, Wang and 
Wang (2005) analyzed the launch in 25 major countries of 85 new chemical 
entities (NCEs) between 1994 and 1998. They use the average price of the existing 
drugs in the same therapy group as a proxy of the intensity of regulation. Similarly 
in order to estimate potential market size they use the average sales volume of 
the existing drugs. Higher prices and bigger potential of sales are found to be 
increasing the probability and speed of launch. Danzon and Epstein (2008) 
analyzed the launch decisions of all drugs in 12 therapeutic categories launched in 
15 countries between 1992 and 2003. Similar to Danzon’s first paper on the topic 
they used the average price of established products on the therapeutic group of 
the drug as the proxy for the intensity of regulation. They found a small but 
statistically significant, negative effect of strict regulation on the launch of drugs.  
However those methods do not explicitly control for the regulatory 
environment. Lanjouw (2005) used a direct variable to control the intensity of 
regulation in each country. She created dummy variables for several regulation 
forms such as existences product patents, process patents, price controls, and 
national drug formularies. She found that intensity of regulation in high income 
countries reduce access to new drugs though her evidence on poor and middle 
income countries is more mixed.  
On the other hand in order to incorporate the regulatory environment of the 
countries Kyle (2007) used the general market competition index by Djankov et al. 
(2002) and a set of dummies for different types of price controls. However market 
competition index is a general one which has a single value for all sectors in the 
country. So it might not represent the characteristics of pharmaceutical markets 
of the countries. Nevertheless she concluded that price controls have statistically 
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negative effect on the launch not only for the price controlling country but other 
countries as well. Heuer et al. (2007) focused on drugs approved by the European 
Medicines Evaluation Agency centralized procedure. Drugs approved by European 
Medicines Evaluation Agency are automatically approved in member countries. 
This approach allowed them to separate the effects of national price and 
reimbursement regulations from the impact of the market authorization 
procedure. They found that among the direct price controls, only international 
price comparisons have a significantly negative impact on the launch timing.  
In this paper we use the similar techniques and data sources to study the 
launch decisions of drug companies. However we believe our analysis extends the 
existing literature in several important aspects. Most papers use either the 
average price of the existing drugs or ad hoc dummies for specific regulations as a 
proxy for the strictness of the regulation.5 However, a low price can be attributed 
to the either low demand or strict market regulations. Demand depends on the 
number of potential consumers (patients) and their willingness to pay. So the 
studies which used average price as the proxy for intensity of regulation are 
arguably mixing regulation and demand conditions. In this study we use new data 
compiled by Liu and La Croix (2008) that gives a Pharmaceutical Intellectual 
Property Protection Index for 154 countries. This index is better for our purposes 
than general market competition index of Djankov et al. (2002), and complements 
ad hoc specific dummies for certain types of market control instruments and 
average price of existing prices. We discuss the Liu-LaCroix index in some detail 
later.  
The second contribution of our paper is that we specifically consider the 
potential market size for new drugs. In earlier papers some researchers proxy 
potential market size by sales volume of existing drugs and/or number of existing 
drugs in the same therapy group. Although these measures are useful we believe 
that they are not ideal. Even if they treat the same disease, no two drugs are 
exactly the same. Many new drugs will have improvements over the existing drugs 
at least on some margin. So new drugs not only steal market share from exiting 
drugs but also can expand the market size of the whole therapeutic group. In 
other words the sales volume of existing drugs is not a perfect proxy for the 
potential market size for new drugs. In previous papers we have hypothesized 
that if there are still patients suffering due to certain diseases, existing drugs are 
not doing a good job of treating all patients. Maybe some patients cannot be 
treated with the existing drugs because of side effects or they are not accessible 
by all patients due their high prices.  In the extreme case where nobody is dying 
                                                          
5
 See Garattini and Ghislandi (2007) for a short critique of the existing literature. 
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due to a disease, the implication is that existing drugs can treat all patients and 
potential market for the new drug is zero6. On the other extreme case where lots 
of people are dying due to a disease, it implies that existing drugs or other 
therapies are not effective and a good and an effective drug would have lots of 
potential patients (customers). Thus, in this study we use the “years lost” to 
disease as the proxy for potential market size for new drugs. Obviously many 
diseases do not kill people but reduce their quality of life. In earlier papers we 
used both mortality (potential years lost) and morbidity as the predictor for 
potential markets for new drugs. The results were very similar. In this study due to 
data limitations we use mortality (morbidity data is not available in the panel form 
for the countries we use in our analysis).7 
3. Data and Methodology 
Information on drug launches is obtained from IMS New Product Focus 
dataset maintained by consulting firm: IMS Health8. The dataset includes the 
trade name of the drug, active ingredients of the drug, the target disease, and 
launch date of the drug in each country for the most major drug markets in the 
world between 1982 and 2008.9 Our main variable of the interest is launch 
decisions of the drug companies. We check for each new chemical entity (NCE) 
whether it has been launched in each country and if it has how long it did take to 
launch the drug in the country since the first introduction of the drug anywhere in 
the world.10  
The IMS New Product Focus dataset has the information about the target 
disease for each NCE. We want to measure the potential market demand for each 
NCE in each country. A measure of market demand is the prevalence of the 
specific disease treated by the NCE in each country. Our hypothesis is that if there 
is significant number of people dying at a relatively early age due to the disease, it 
means that existing drugs or alternative treatments do not work very well. Thus 
there is a high sale potential for the drug.    
                                                          
6
 Of course new drugs can compete with the old ones on the price and obtain some 
market share 
7
 See Civan and Maloney (2006, 2009) for more thorough discussion 
8
 IMS Health is a consulting company which provides data to the investors, companies, 
policy makers and academics. 
9
 Unfortunately, we do not have data on China. 
10
 Some drugs have multiple active ingredients. In that respect we did not treat multi-
ingredient drugs differently from single-ingredient drugs.  For multiple ingredient drugs 
there is only one new chemical entity introduced first time to the country with that 
specific drug.  
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The disease prevalence statistic that we use is the Potential Years of Life Lost 
(PYLL) obtained from OECD Health Data 2010 dataset. OECD Health Data 2010 
dataset’s definition and method of calculation are given as follows:11  
"Potential Years of Life Lost (PYLL) is a summary measure of 
premature mortality which provides an explicit way of weighting deaths 
occurring at younger ages, which are, a priori, preventable. The 
calculation of PYLL involves summing up deaths occurring at each age 
and multiplying this with the number of remaining years to live up to a 
selected age limit.  
The limit of 70 years has been chosen for the calculations in OECD 
Health Data. In order to assure cross-country and trend comparison, the 
PYLL are standardized, for each country i and each year t as follows: 
1
0
(1 )( / )( / ) 100000
l
it at at a na
PYLL a d p P P


    
where a stands for age, l is the upper age limit chosen for the measure 
(70 years old in OECD Health Data), dat is the number of deaths at age a, 
pat refers to the number of persons aged a in country i at time t, Pa refers 
to the number of persons aged a in the reference population, and Pn 
refers to the total number of persons in the reference population." 
Each NCE is a unique active ingredient. The data have information about the 
target diseases of each NCE. However matching the specific drugs with the 
potential years of life lost is very difficult. For many drugs the target disease is not 
unique. For example many drugs are used in the treatment of different types of 
cancers. Moreover the mortality statistics (potential years of life lost) might not 
be accurate at the cause of the death at the disease level. So we grouped the 
drugs and mortality statistics into broad health problem categories such as 
endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases, diseases of the blood and blood-
forming organs, and malignant neoplasm, etc. There are 11 health problem 
categories. These are: Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases, Diseases of 
the blood and blood-forming organs and certain disorders involving the immune 
mechanism, Diseases of the circulatory system, Diseases of the skin and 
subcutaneous tissue, Diseases of the genitourinary system, Certain infectious and 
parasitic diseases, Malignant neoplasm, Diseases of the musculoskeletal system 
and connective tissue, Diseases of the nervous system, Diseases of the respiratory 
                                                          
11
www.ecosante.fr/index2.php?base=OCDE&langs=ENG&langh=ENG&valeur=&source=1 
(accesses on 12/08/2010). 
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system, Diseases of the eye and adnexa, ear. Table 1 also shows the number of 
NCEs that we were able to match to one of these health problem categories. 
Per capita income, per capita health expenditures and population data are 
also obtained from OECD Health Data 2010 dataset at country, year level. At the 
health-problem, country, and year level per capita drug expenditure is also 
obtained from the same dataset. 
One of our main explanatory variables is the intellectual property rights 
environment of the country. Our hypothesis is that drug companies would not 
launch their drugs in “unfriendly” countries where intellectual property rights of 
pharmaceutical innovator firms are not protected rigorously. There are many 
indexes which measure the intensity of general intellectual property protection of 
the countries. However the countries which are similar on general intellectual 
property protection level can have very different protection for pharmaceutical 
drugs. So we used a drug specific index. Liu and La Croix (2008) created 
Pharmaceutical Intellectual Property Protection (PIPP) Index and report its value 
for every five years from 1960 to 2005 for 154 countries. Their index consists of 
three parts: Pharmaceutical Patent Rent Appropriation (PPRA) index, 
Pharmaceutical Patent International Agreements (PPIA) index, and 
Pharmaceutical Patent Enforcement (PPE) index. PPRA measures whether a 
country has established six types of intellectual property rights in 
pharmaceuticals;12 PPE looks for seven statutory measures of enforcement;13 and 
PPIA controls for the whether the country has signed main international 
agreements on intellectual rights protection.
14
 Their index has values from 0 to 5. 
Higher numbers suggest better protection of pharmaceutical intellectual property 
rights.15 
                                                          
12
 These are product patents, process patents, new medical indication patents, 
formulation patents, pediatric use patents and data exclusivity.  
13
 Preliminary injunctions, contributory infringement pleadings, burden-of-proof reversals, 
national exhaustion, working requirements, compulsory licensing and revocation of 
patents for nonworking. 
14
 This is measured by whether the country is a signatory of  Paris Convention, Patent 
Cooperation Treaty 
(PCT) of 1970 and the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
Agreement of 1995. 
15
 An alternative index for property rights protection is one developed by Ginarte, Juan C., 
Walter G. Park. 1997. “Determinants of Patent Rights: A Cross-National Study.” Research 
Policy 26(3): 283-301. We use this index as well in some specifications. The estimated 
effects are little changed. The G-P appears to build in more demand determinants and 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Launch 397944 0.0300 0.1800 0.0000 1.0000 
Delay Time 397944 9.1500 6.6400 0.0000 27.0000 
I.P. Protection 397944 2.3700 1.2900 0.0000 4.7800 
Population 397944 30323.95 48386.13 234.00 304483.00 
GDP per capita 393319 18372.38 11356.00 2155.54 56358.12 
Years Lost to Disease 331671 100090.81 271840.19 0.0100 3118211.00 
Health Care Exp./GDP 363859 7.81000 1.9800 1.6000 16.0000 
Pharmaceutical Sales 166180 716.3500 1352.78 1.0000 13904.00 
Ref. Pricing Int’l 397944 0.5480 0.4980 0.0000 1.0000 
Ref. Pricing Th. 397944 0.2820 0.4500 0.0000 1.0000 
New Drugs in Class 397944 0.2300 0.6200 0.0000 9.0000 
Total Drugs in Class  397944 2.9000 5.0600 0.0000 36.0000 
Notes: Launch takes value of one when the drug is launched in a country. Delay Time is years from initial launch 
world wide to launch in a given country. Population in thousands. Years Lost takes account of the age at death 
and the life expectancy by country by ten different disease codes. Pharmaceutical sales are by disease codes. I.P. 
Enforcement is intellectual property enforcement for pharmaceuticals reported every five years starting in 1980. 
We extrapolate between years. Drug Class is the therapeutic grouping of each drug. New drugs are the number 
(other than the observation) approved in country j in the given year. Total is the sum of drugs approved in 
country j in the past. Pharmaceutical sales are by disease class. Ref. Pricing Int’l is regulatory pricing based on 
international reference; Ref. Pricing Th. is regulatory pricing based on domestic therapeutic references. 
It is reasonable to wonder how this property-rights index is distributed across 
countries. We look at OECD countries and one might speculate that there is little 
variation in the property rights index across these countries. There has been a 
substantial improvement in property rights protection from 1980 to 2005. 
Although generally more advanced countries have higher index values, there is 
substantial variation in the index across countries at each end of the spectrum. 
For example US, Canada, UK, and UK can be considered as a comparable 
development levels their index numbers of 2005 are consecutively: 4.78, 3.09, 
3.64, 3.30. Hungary on the other hand has the index value of 3.98. So property-
rights index does not just correlate with the development level of the country and 
indeed measures some other aspects of the regulatory environment.   
                                                                                                                                                   
therefore is not a useful in disentangling these alternative effects in terms of the drug 
launch decision. Liu and La Croix state that their index values for many countries are 
substantially different that Ginarte-Park values and overall correlation coefficient for two 
indexes is 0.65. 
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Table 1 shows summary statistics for the variables that we will use in the 
analysis. The unit of observation is a drug, country, year. There are 1095 drugs in 
our sample, 31 countries, and 27 years of data for most countries (1982-2008). 
Observations begin for each country in the year that a drug is first introduced 
anywhere in the world. Observations end when a country launches the drug or at 
the end of the sample period, 2008.  
For the drug-country pairs, for which we have data on 397,944, there are 
13,315 drugs launches, or about 3 percent of the sample of drug|country|year 
observations. The delay time to launch averages about nine years but the median 
is around six. Total national healthcare expenditures vary from 1.6 percent of GDP 
(Turkey) to 16 percent (United States). 
We include two variables in Table 1 that proxy for unobservable 
characteristics of the drug approval regime in each country. These are the number 
of drugs in a drug class that have been approved in the past and the number that 
are approved in a given year.16 The NCE data identify various categories for drugs: 
the 1095 drugs in the sample are placed into 221 categories. We count the drug 
launches by these categories. At the maximum there were 9 other new drugs in 
the same category launched in the same country in the same year. At the time of 
a drug launch, there were on average 2.9 existing drugs in the category.  
The entire intrigue of our observed phenomenon would be deflated if drug-
launch were just a block-buster effect. That is, if many or most drugs are launched 
everywhere because they are the best and the rest just pop up here and there, we 
don’t have an interesting story. To address this issue we construct Table 2 which 
shows the frequency of drugs launched across countries. The table shows that 
there is more of a dart-board effect than a block-buster one. Only a few drugs are 
launched everywhere; on the other hand, a substantial minority of drugs are 
launched in only one country.  
It is somewhat striking that so many drugs are launched in only one country, 
and it does raise a concern that these drugs may be of little importance and their 
adoption is not driven by issues of intellectual property right protection. We 
investigate this by excluding those drugs only launched in one or two countries. 
We report these result along with other alternative specifications in Appendix. 
We use a hazard model to capture the effects of regulation and market size 
on the launch decision for each drug in each country. The decision to launch is 
                                                          
16
 In the regression, when we use the variable for number approved in a given year, we 
subtract one so that it measures the number of other drugs in the class approved in that 
year.  
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{0,1} for a drug, country, year. We model this as a probit function with delay time, 
intellectual property rights enforcement, and various other independent 
variables. Delay time is zero for the country that first launches the drug. 
Table 2. Frequency of Drugs Launched across Countries 
Number of Countries Adopting Number of Drugs 
31 60 
30 54 
29 43 
28 39 
27 41 
26 26 
25 25 
24 33 
23 22 
22 18 
21 15 
20 24 
19 16 
18 17 
17 13 
16 17 
15 16 
14 12 
13 15 
12 16 
11 17 
10 21 
9 21 
8 17 
7 11 
6 21 
5 14 
4 19 
3 30 
2 59 
1 314 
Notes: Drugs launched in OECD countries totals 1066. 
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We want to explain the no-launch phenomenon. We do this by explaining the 
launch decision, and then by inference, the no-launch result. We use a probit 
specification to estimate the probability of launch. Launch may occur immediately 
or with delay. The model accounts for this. After some point if launch has not 
occurred, we use the model to declare a no-launch. This estimation method 
accounts for the cases where the drug is never launched in a country.  
We choose ten years as the focus point; that is, we look at the probability of 
a drug launching or not by ten years after it is first launched somewhere in the 
world. The choice of ten years is arbitrary, and the results are not sensitive to this 
choice.17 This statement can be expressed in the following form using the probit 
regression estimates: 
 
10
10
0
1 ( ( ), )nl
t
P probit x t t

   
where 10
nlP is the probability that a drug is not launched for ten years, t is the delay 
time from the first launch and x(t) are the other independent variables. The probit 
model estimates control for the factors that predict a drug launch. The probit 
specification allows for the launch to occur immediately or later, and allows for 
changes through time in the independent variables that affect this outcome. It 
gives an estimate of what causes drugs to get launched and then by probabilistic 
expression explains why drugs do not get launched.18 
The independent variables in addition to delay time and property rights 
enforcement include population, years lost to disease in the disease category 
treated by the drug, health expenditures relative to GDP, the number of other 
drugs in that drug category launched in a country in prior years and in the given 
                                                          
17
 Ten years is about the time that a drug will enjoy patent protection in the United States 
after it gains approval.  
18
 We considered and some readers have suggested that we use a selection-style model 
with an equation for the launch decision and an equation for the delay. However, to be 
effective the selection model requires that the researcher has information on 
characteristics that separately affect launch and delay. In our case, it is hard to imagine 
variables that affect one and not the other. Moreover, the selection model is really a 
special case of the hazard model, which directly focuses on our point of interest. Consider 
the following problem. Launch can occur anytime after the chemical compound is ready 
for market. If we estimate a selection model of launch what demographic variables in time 
are we to use for a given country—those in place at the time the drug is first launched 
world-wide; those existing five years later; those ten years later; the average?  Strong 
assumptions must be made in the selection-model approach while the hazard model 
naturally incorporates the time-evolution of the data in a meaningful way.  
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year, and the date of the world-wide launch. We include income per capita, 
pharmaceutical sales by health category, and indicators for reference pricing in 
alternative specifications. Population, years lost, health expenditures, and per 
capita incomes are all proxy measures of the size of the market for the drug. The 
number of similar drugs ever launched in a country is intended to pick up 
idiosyncratic characteristics of each country’s regulatory process. The date of first 
launch is included as a trend effect. 
4. Results and Discussions 
The main regressions are shown in Table 3, the estimated marginal effects 
are shown in Table 4, and assessment of the model accuracy is shown in Table 5.  
Five specifications are shown in Table 3. The standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and clustered by country. Correlations between population, 
disease incidence, and health expenditures mean that not all variables can be 
included in each regression. The signs in the reported specifications are consistent 
with theory. Market size measured in different ways increases the probability of 
launch. Importantly, intellectual property protection is always positively and 
significantly related to launch. Delay has a negative coefficient in the probit 
estimates. This means that the probability of launch is highest in the beginning 
and then declines year by year. The cumulative probability of launch goes up, but 
at a decreasing rate.  
The models presented in Table 3 estimate the probability of launch in one 
year. Our interest has a longer time frame, which is what we account for in Table 
5.  
The control variable measuring the number of other drugs in the drug 
category that were approved in a country in a given year is significant and 
positive. The coefficient says that there seem to be waves of launch of the same 
sort of drugs; the likelihood of launch increases when other drugs of the same sort 
are launched. The total number of drugs launched in the past is negative and 
statistically significant in specification (1). The negative sign says that a new drug 
in a category is less likely to be launched; the more drugs of that sort are already 
on the market in a given country. These variables could be accounting for 
unobserved regulatory effects that vary across countries and we categorize them 
as unobservable market characteristics. Time of world-wide launch acts as a time 
fixed-effect and says that drug launches have been increasing over time. In the 
regressions shown in Table 3, we use disease incidence, population, health 
expenditures, and pharmaceutical sales as direct measures of market size. The 
coefficients are not always estimated with precision based on the clustered 
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standard errors. Even so the effects are consistent with theory, and taken 
together, the larger the market size, the higher the probability of launch. In those 
specifications where the regulatory proxies (number of other drugs approved by 
drug class) are excluded, the market size effects are stronger. It is possible that 
the number of drugs approved in each drug class is picking up market size as 
opposed to or in addition to regulatory idiosyncrasies. In this case it makes sense 
that omitting these variables would increase the significance of the other market 
sizes measures. It is worth noting that in specification (5), pharmaceutical sales is 
statistically significant. It measures the sales volume of drugs by disease class, so it 
varies by drug and country. Unfortunately, we have limited data coverage for this 
variable.   Other variables of interest and other specifications are shown in Tables 
A1 and B2 in the appendix. Income appears to measure about the same thing as 
health expenditures and not as precisely. It has the wrong sign when included in 
addition to health expenditures (not shown). We also re-estimate specifications 
(1) and (2) omitting those drugs that are only launched in one country (recall 
Table 2). The results shown in Table 3 are unaltered. These results are reported in 
Table A1. 
Existence of reference pricing can influence the profitability and thus launch 
decisions. Reference pricing means that regulatory authorities peg the price that 
drug companies can charge based on the prices of similar drugs (therapeutic 
reference pricing) or on the price that the company charges for the drug in other 
countries (international reference pricing). Unfortunately we do not have a time 
series of these regulatory patterns but only an indicator of this for the most 
recent period. Moreover, maybe a more important issue for the drug companies 
is not whether the country has reference pricing system but whether the country 
is in the basket of reference countries for other countries with significant market 
potentials.  It would be especially relevant if the drug prices in this country affect 
the prices in a bigger and profitable country (i.e. this country to be in the basket of 
reference countries in the bigger country) For example drug companies would be 
reluctant to launch their new drugs at Belgium at a cheap price if the prices in 
Belgium is used to determine the prices in Germany or France. Naturally drug 
companies would delay their launches in Belgium until their drugs are launched 
and established in France and Germany. Unfortunately keeping track of these 
baskets of reference countries is even more difficult. In any case reference pricing 
variables are not statistically significant and the inclusion of them does not change 
appreciably the magnitudes of the other variables.  
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Table 3. Probit Estimates of Drug Launch 
Independent Variables: 
Specifications 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Time from 1
st
 Launch 
World Wide 
-0.0900
a 
(0.0090) 
-0.0880
a
 
(0.0070) 
-0.0930
a
 
(0.0090) 
-0.0910
a
 
(0.0070) 
-0.0990
a
 
(0.0090) 
Intellectual Property 
Protection 
0.1000
a
 
(0.0340) 
0.0860
a
 
(0.0240) 
0.1020
a
 
(0.0340) 
0.0890
a
 
(0.0250) 
0.1730
a
 
(0.0640) 
Disease Incidence 
0.0170 
(0.0120) 
- 
0.0220
c
 
(0.0130) 
- - 
Population - 
0.0600
b
 
(0.0250) 
- 
0.0630
b
 
(0.0260) 
- 
Health Expenditures 
0.3270 
(0.2220) 
0.2050 
(0.1690) 
0.3300 
(0.2340) 
0.2100 
(0.1810) 
- 
Pharmaceutical Sales - - - - 
0.0450
b
 
(0.0230) 
World-Wide Launch Year 
0.0980
b
 
(0.0490) 
0.1090
a
 
(0.0400) 
0.0900
b
 
(0.0510) 
0.1010
a
 
(0.0420) 
0.0270 
(0.0640) 
Total Drugs in Class 
-0.0040
b
 
(0.0020) 
-0.0040  
(0.0020) 
- - - 
New Drugs in Class 
0.1460
a
 
(0.0110) 
0.1460
a
 
(0.0090) 
- - - 
Constant 
-2.4980 
(0.4170) 
-2.6760 
(0.3060) 
-2.4720 
(0.4410) 
-2.6330 
(0.3320) 
-1.6170 
(0.2160) 
Log Likelihood -3983 -47122 -40115 -47468 -19767 
Pseudo R
2
 0.1410 0.1460 0.1350 0.1390 0.1620 
Observations 307136 363859 307136 363859 166180 
Notes: Standard errors below coefficients are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered by 
country. I.P. protection, population, health expenditures and disease incidence in logs. Health 
expenditures divided by GDP. World-wide launch year is divided by 10. Total drugs in class is divided 
by 10. Significance levels: (a) 1 percent; (b) 5 percent; (c) 10 percent. 
A major concern is that our model does not capture all of the dimensions of 
the demand for new drugs. This creates an omitted variable problem and one that 
may be correlated to the main variable of interest in our study: intellectual 
property right protection. It may be that countries with poorly measured demand 
for new drugs are also likely to be countries that have limited demand for IP 
protection. While we think that we have done a good job of measuring drug 
demand and market size, table A2 shows the probit regression results including 
fixed effects for country, country interacted with the time trend, and country 
interacted with time and with the property rights variable. There is basically no 
change from the results presented in Table 3. The estimated coefficient on the 
A. Civan & M. Maloney / JEFA Vol:1 No:1 (2017) 35-58 
 
Page | 51  
 
property rights variable is very similar to that in Table 3 when only country fixed 
effects are used. It is larger when country fixed effects are interacted with the 
time trend, and larger still on average when country fixed effects are interacted 
with time and with the property rights variable. In this last specification, there is a 
good deal of variation across countries in the magnitude of the estimated 
coefficient on the property rights variable. However, only four countries have an 
estimated effect of opposite sign to the average, and of these only one is 
statistically significant (Israel, at the 0.05 level).19 Overall, the results reported in 
Table 3 are robust to various specifications, and across countries and time.  
Table 4 shows the magnitudes of the estimated effects. To do this, we 
calculate the probability of launch in the first ten years as discussed above. The 
first row of Table 4 gives the probability of launch within the first ten years across 
all countries for a drug with a world-wide launch date of 1999. Obviously, the 
model fits the data at the mean. For the average country, the probability of 
launch is slightly less than 40 percent. Row two shows the model evaluated for 
the variables measured at the U.S. values. The probability of launch is around 
twenty percentage points higher.  
The following rows in Table 4 give the marginal effects of the variables. Here 
we ask how much does a one standard deviation increase in each variable from 
the world-wide average change the probability of launch in the first ten years. 
Intellectual property protection increases the probability of launch by around 7 
percentage points for a one standard deviation increase. Population and disease 
incidence have important effects, though disease incidence is smaller; health 
expenditure is also substantial. The effect of IP protection is consistently 
estimated across the two specifications shown. Standard errors derived from 
bootstrap estimation are shown in parentheses. The marginal effects for health 
expenditures, population, and disease incidence are not estimated with precision. 
However their combined effects in the two specifications are statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19
 These coefficients include the estimated coefficient of the property rights variable 
standing alone (-0.14) plus the average value of the log of the time trend, which is 3.12, 
times the estimated coefficient of the property rights variable for each country.  
A. Civan & M. Maloney / JEFA Vol:1 No:1 (2017) 35-58 
 
Page | 52  
 
Table 4. Probability of Drug Launching by Year 10 
Independent Variables Evaluated 
Specification 
(1) (2) 
for year 1999 0.3990 0.3930 
for US 1999 values 0.5840 0.6010 
Marginal Individual Effects 
Specification 
(1) (2) 
I.P. Protection 
0.0780 
(0.0280) 
0.0670 
(0.0180) 
Population - 
0.0610 
(0.0330) 
Disease incidence 
0.0310 
(0.0240) 
- 
Health Exp. / GDP  
0.0580 
(0.0360) 
0.0360 
(0.0310) 
Percent of Probability of Launch 
Made up by Observable Effects 
73.40% 74.10% 
Notes: Individual effects are the increase in the probability of launch by year 10 for a one standard 
deviation increase in each independent variable holding others constant. Bootstrap standard errors 
in parentheses. Independent variables are evaluated for year 1999 by averaging from 1995-2004. 
Joint test of significance of diseased incidence and health expenditures and of population and health 
expenditures significant at the 5 percent level. 
In the probit specification we can compare the impact of the observable 
characteristics (I.P. protection, population, disease incidence, and health 
expenditures) to the unobservable (time trend and number of other drugs in the 
drug category) by multiplying the estimated coefficients by the means of the 
independent variables. That is, let xi, i=1,k be the independent variables 
associated with observable market characteristics and i=k+1,n be the variables 
associated with unobservable characteristics. Then,  
 
 𝛽𝑖?̅?𝒊𝑖=1,𝑘
 𝛽𝑖?̅?𝒊𝑖=1,𝑛
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is the proportion of the cumulative distribution of the probability of launch that is 
attributable to observable market characteristics, where the β’s are the estimated 
coefficients and the x’s are evaluated at their means.20 
This calculation is reported in Table 4. The values are greater than 70 
percent. This says that market size and market friendliness explain a large 
majority of the estimated launch/no-launch decision. 
Finally, Table 5 gives an assessment of the goodness-of-fit for the model. We 
focus on specification (2) from Table 3 because it encompasses the largest 
number of observations. The other models give similar results. Goodness-of-fit is 
assessed in a two-by-two table of predictions versus outcomes. We look at the 
drug, country pairs. We calculate the probability of launch within the first ten 
years and classify the model as predicting launch if that probability is greater than 
0.5; the prediction is no-launch otherwise.21 The observed outcomes are whether 
the drug is actually launched or not in a given country. There are 29895 observed 
drug, country events. Of these, 12189 are drug launches and 17706 are no-
launches. The table shows the number of observations and the percentage of the 
total sample in each of the four cells.  
Table 5. Model Accuracy 
Model 
Events (29895 total) 
Model Accuracy 
Launched Not Launched 
Launch 
4658 
(15.5800) 
506 
(1.6900) 
0.9000 
No Launch 
7531 
(25.1900) 
17200 
(57.5300) 
0.7000 
Total 12189 17706 - 
Notes: Events are drug, country pairs. Percent of total sample in parentheses below subsample 
sizes. Model Accuracy is based on predicted value of 0.5 for ten years from specification (2) from 
Table 3; that is, the model is said to be correct if the predicted value is greater than 0.5 and the 
event occurs. Model Accuracy is the percent of time the model predicts a launch and it happens 
(first row); or the percent of time the model predict no-launch and there is no launch (second row). 
The number of observed drug launches includes drug launched in 2009, and so differs from the 
number used in Table 3. 
                                                          
20
 This is not a perfect measure because it is depend on the estimated constant term, but 
it is indicative of the relation between observable and unobservable characteristics. The 
value of delay is set to zero.   
21
 For simplicity of calculation we use the x values for each country in the year of world-
wide launch. 
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The results shown in Table 5 are fairly striking. The model is quite accurate in 
explaining the puzzle that we posed in the introduction. The model has 70 percent 
accuracy in explaining the number of drugs that are never launched across 
countries. That is, the model predicts no-launch in 24,731 cases (7531+17200) and 
is correct 17200 times. The model is even more accurate in correctly predicting 
launches. The major error of the model is in under-predicting the number of drugs 
that are launched. But the fact that the model is good at predicting the no-launch 
event is important. The model explains 70 percent of the no-launch decision and 
of this, 90+ percent is attributable to directly observable market-size and market-
friendly conditions.   
5. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the conundrum of why new drugs are not launched 
everywhere in the world. On average new chemical entities are launched in less 
than half the countries of the world. This is odd; we imagine that drug companies 
would want to launch every drug everywhere. Our model explains a substantial 
part of this phenomenon.  
We find that market size and property rights enforcement account for a large 
part of the reason why drugs are not launched everywhere. For instance, 
comparing the United States to the rest of the OECD countries on these margins, 
the probability of a drug launch in the first ten years is higher by 20 percentage 
points. Moreover, we find that intellectual property protection has a large impact. 
Increasing IP enforcement one standard deviation adds around 7 percentage 
points to the likelihood of launch. Our model explains 70 percent of the no-launch 
events, and over 70 percent of these are explained by observable characteristics 
of market size and intellectual property protection. The major policy implication 
of our research is that stronger intellectual property protection could significantly 
reduce the launch delays.  
On the other hand we want to emphasize that, we have not analyzed the 
benefits of price controls and loose intellectual property rights protection for drug 
companies. They might create substantial benefits to the patients and 
government budgets through lower drug prices. In order to provide clear policy 
implications both costs and benefits of price controls and intellectual property 
rights protection have to be assessed. 
 
 
 
A. Civan & M. Maloney / JEFA Vol:1 No:1 (2017) 35-58 
 
Page | 55  
 
References 
Acemoglu, D., and Linn, J. (2004). Market Size in Innovation: Theory and Evidence 
from the Pharmaceutical Industry. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119 
(August), 1049-1090. 
Becker, G. S., Philipson, T. J. & Soares, R. R. (2005). The quantity and quality of life 
and the evolution of world inequality. American Economic Review, 95 (1), 
277–291. 
Civan, A., and Maloney, M. (2006). The determinants of pharmaceutical research 
& development investments. Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy, 5 
(1) 
Civan, A., and Maloney, M. (2009). The effect of price on pharmaceutical R&D. 
Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy, 9 (1), 1-24. 
Civan, A., and Koksal, B. (2010). The effect of newer drugs on health spending: Do 
they really increase the costs? Health Economics, 19 (5), 581–595. 
Danzon, P., Wang, R., and Wang, L. (2005). The impact of price regulation on the 
launch delay of new drugs: evidence from 25 major markets in the1990s. 
Health Economics, 14 (3), 269–292. 
Danzon, P., and Epstein, A. (2008). Effects of regulation on drug launch and pricing 
in interdependent markets. NBER Working Paper 14041. 
Danzon, P., and Furukawa, M. (2008). International Prices and Availability Of 
Pharmaceuticals In 2005. Health Affairs, 27 (1), 221-233.  
Demsetz, H. (1970). The Private Production of Public Goods. Journal of Law and 
Economics, 8 (2), 293-306. 
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A. (2002). The 
Regulation of Entry. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117 (1), 1–38. 
Garattini, L., and Ghislandi, S. (2007). Should we really worry about "launch 
delays" of new drugs in OECD countries? The European Journal of Health 
Economics, 8 (1), 1-3. 
Giaccotto, C., Santerre, R., & Vernon, J.A. (2005). Pricing and R&D Investment 
Behavior in the Pharmaceutical Industry. Journal of Law and Economics, 48 
(1), 195-214. 
Heuer, A., Mejer, M., & Neuhaus, J. (2007). The national regulation of 
pharmaceutical markets and the timing of newdrug launches in Europe. Kiel 
A. Civan & M. Maloney / JEFA Vol:1 No:1 (2017) 35-58 
 
Page | 56  
 
Advanced Studies Working paper 437. Kiel, Germany: Kiel Institute for the 
World Economy. 
Kanavos, P., Ferrario, A., Vandoros, S., and Anderson, G. (2013). Higher US 
Branded Drug Prices And Spending Compared To Other Countries May Stem 
Partly From Quick Uptake Of New Drugs. Health Affairs, 32 (4), 753-761. 
Kyle, M. (2007). Pharmaceutical price controls and entry strategies. Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 89 (1), 88-99. 
Lanjouw, J.O. (2005). Patents, price controls and access to new drugs: How policy 
affects global market entry. NBER working paper No.11321. 
Lichtenberg, F. (2001). Are the benefits of newer drugs worth their cost? Evidence 
from the 1996 MEPS. Health Affairs, 20 (5), 241-51.  
Lichtenberg, F. (2005). The Impact of New Drug Launches on Longevity: Evidence 
from Longitudinal, Disease-Level Data from 52 Countries, 1982-2001. 
International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, 5 (1), 47-73. 
Lichtenberg, F. (2006). The impact of increased utilization of HIV drugs on 
longevity and medical expenditure: An assessment based on aggregate U.S. 
time-series data. Expert Review of Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes 
Research, 6 (4), 425-436.  
Liu, M., and La Croix, S. (2008). A cross-country index of intellectual property 
rights in pharmaceutical Innovations. Unpublished manuscript  
Murphy, K., and Topel, R. (2003). The economic value of medical research. In K. 
Murphy & R. Topel (Eds.), Measuring the Gains from Medical Research: An 
Economic Approach. The University of Chicago Press. 
Oster, E., Shoulson, I., and Dorsey, R. (2012). Limited Life Expectancy, Human 
Capital and Health Investments: Evidence from Huntington Disease. NBER 
Working Paper No. 17931 
Rosen, S. (1988). The value of changes in life expectancy. Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty, 1(3), 285-304. 
Soares, R.R. (2007). Health and the evolution of welfare across Brazilian 
municipalities. Journal of Development Economics, 84 (2), 590‐608. 
 
 
 
A. Civan & M. Maloney / JEFA Vol:1 No:1 (2017) 35-58 
 
Page | 57  
 
Appendix A. Alternative Specifications 
Table A1. Probit Estimates of Drug Launch–Alternative Specifications 
Independent Variables 
Specifications 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Time 
-0.0810
a
 
(0.0090) 
-0.0780
a
 
(0.0070) 
-0.0870
a
 
(0.0080) 
-0.0840
a
 
(0.0070) 
-0.0960
a
 
(0.0090) 
Intellectual Property 
Protection 
0.1020
a
 
(0.0390) 
0.0860
a
 
(0.0290) 
0.1100
a
 
(0.0350) 
0.0940
a
 
(0.0330) 
0.1660
a
 
(0.0600) 
Disease Incidence 
0.0220 
(0.0140) 
- 
0.0210
c
 
(0.0120) 
- - 
Population - 
0.0620
b
 
(0.0310) 
- 
0.0730
b
 
(0.0250) 
- 
Health Expenditures 
0.4530
c
 
(0.2540) 
0.2970 
(0.1990) 
- - - 
Income per capita - - 
0.0220 
(0.0730) 
0.0290 
(0.0570) 
- 
Pharmaceutical Sales - - - - 
0.0390
c
 
(0.0210) 
World-Wide Launch Year 
0.0910 
(0.0580) 
0.1050
b
 
(0.0470) 
0.1270
a
 
(0.0420) 
0.1390
a
 
(0.0380) 
0.0430 
(0.0600) 
Total Drugs in Class 
-0.0430 
(0.0290) 
-0.0240 
(0.0310) 
-0.0320 
(0.0310) 
-0.0270 
(0.0310) 
0.0780 
(0.0530) 
New Drugs in Class 
0.1440
a
 
(0.0110) 
0.1480
a
 
(0.0100) 
0.1480
a
 
(0.0120) 
0.1500
a
 
(0.0100) 
0.1790
a
 
(0.0140) 
Constant 
-2.6070 
(0.4650) 
-2.7140 
(0.3550) 
-2.2110 
(0.7520) 
-2.8110 
(0.7210) 
-1.7210 
(0.2020) 
Log Likelihood -34796 -41318 -41935 -49663 -19550 
Pseudo R
2
 0.1260 0.1290 0.1340 0.1420 0.1710 
Observations 179638 213245 327618 393319 166180 
Notes: Standard errors below coefficients are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered by 
country. I.P. protection, population,  health expenditures and disease incidence in logs. Health 
expenditures divided by GDP. World-wide launch year and total drugs in class divided by 10. 
Significance levels: (a) 1 percent; (b) 5 percent; (c) 10 percent. Columns (1) and (2) omit drugs that 
have only been launched in one country.  
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Table A2. Probit Estimation including Fixed Effects 
Probit Specification 
Coefficient on IP 
Variable 
Country Fixed Effects 0.1000 
Country Fixed Effects interacted with Time Trend 0.1630 
Country Fixed Effects interacted with Time Trend and 
Property Rights. Average over all Countries. 
0.5180 
By Country 
 
Australia 0.1140 
Austria 0.0630 
Belgium 0.8770 
Canada 0.4840 
Chile 0.5360 
Czech Republic 0.7140 
Denmark 0.6150 
Estonia 0.3640 
Finland 0.2840 
France 0.4660 
Germany 1.2140 
Greece 0.2760 
Hungary 0.6860 
Iceland -0.0780 
Ireland 0.3980 
Israel -0.0620 
Italy 0.7580 
Japan 0.2980 
Korea 0.1690 
Luxembourg 2.3510 
Mexico 0.0770 
Netherlands 0.5500 
New Zealand 0.1700 
Norway 1.4330 
Poland 0.7880 
Portugal 0.4190 
Slovak Republic 0.8340 
Spain 0.3940 
Sweden 1.3210 
Switzerland -0.0770 
Turkey -0.1530 
United Kingdom 0.5250 
United States 0.3000 
Notes: Country coefficient not estimated for Slovenia because of lack of observations. 
 
